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Abstract 
 
Using  pseudo-panel  microdata  we  show  that  pension  generosity  affects  early  retirement 
decisions. The changes in the average replacement rate and decreases in wealth accrual between 
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1. Introduction 
 
In many industrialized countries, declining fertility rates have already lead to a reduction of 
the active population aged 20 to 65, thereby exerting pressure on social security systems and, in 
particular, pension systems. Because of the importance of this topic, there is a growing body of 
literature that tries to assess the determinants of early retirement (see Blöndal and Scarpetta 1999, 
Johnson 2000, 2001, Duval, 2003). In addition to various workers‟ and job characteristics that 
may affect the decision to retire early, institutional factors such as the generosity of retirement 
schemes may equally play an important role. Traditional economic theory cannot unambiguously 
predict  the  impact  of  institutional  differences  in  pension  systems.  However,  relatively  few 
empirical  studies  exist  that  take  a  look  at  these  institutional  factors.  This  research  void  is 
primarily due to the lack of international microdata which is necessary in order to control for 
individual  as  well  as  institutional  characteristics.  Thus,  all  past  cross-national  studies  have 
analyzed labor market participation rates of older workers using aggregate country-level data 
(e.g. Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1999, Duval, 2003, Johnson 2000, 2001). Such studies, however, 
have a number of drawbacks, including unresolved endogeneity problems, small sample sizes and 
the inability to disentangle micro-level from aggregate-level effects, e.g., for income. On the 
other hand, existing micro-level studies, such as those carried out by and for the OECD in the late 
1990s or those collected in the 2
nd volume of Gruber and Wise (1999), focus on single country 
analyzes only, thus omitting the aspect of international comparisons and thereby generally unable 
to assess the impact of pension generosity on early retirement behavior.  
To remedy such shortcomings, in this study we analyze the institutional determinants of early 
retirement with a unique microdata set covering several European countries. We use data from 
the 2005 Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) which allows us to 
construct a pseudo-panel exploiting the variation in the interviewees‟ retirement dates. It is to our 
best knowledge the first study that assesses the effects of institutional factors on individuals‟ 
early retirement decisions in a cross-national way, using microdata that enable us to control for a 
variety of workers‟ characteristics.  
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2. Data and Methodology 
 
In  this  study,  we  use  the  2005  cross-sectional  SHARE  data  from  a  random  sampling  of 
22,000  persons  over  50  years  of  age  in  10  European  countries  (Austria,  Denmark,  France, 
Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland). Following the OECD 
(1995), we define retired persons as those that (1) self-assess their employment status as retired 
and (2) are factually out of the labor force. About half the respondents (10,600 persons) in the 
SHARE dataset assessed their current job situation as „being retired‟.  
We restrict the analysis to individuals that are older than the legal retirement age in their 
countries in 2004. About 7,000 retirees remain in the dataset, of which approximately 5,000 
retired early and 2,000 retired at the legal retirement age. We define an early retiree as a retired 
person  who  withdrew  from  the  active  labor  force  before  the  legal  age  of  pension  payment 
eligibility.  The  SHARE  recall  data  on  year  of  withdrawal  allow  the  calculation  of  the 
respondent‟s age at the recorded year of retirement, while panel data on the legal retirement ages 
in the 10 countries from 1960 on was obtained from Blöndal and Scarpetta (1999) and Duval 
(2003). However, even though retirement decisions took place in different years between the 
observation period 1967 and 2004, each person is observed only once. Thus, the structure of our 
data gives rise to a European pseudo-panel; a set of repeated, but unbalanced cross-sections of 
micro-level information on retirement decisions of (presently) retired persons. Restriction of the 
sample to those beyond the legal retirement age in 2004 implies that the comparison group of the 
„early retirees‟ are the „regularly retired‟.
1  
To investigate the institutional determinants of early retirement, we view the (conditional) 
probability  of  early  retirement  at  time  t  as  a  function  of  (worker‟s)  personal  and  job 
characteristics  at  the  same  time,  as  well  as  macroeconomic  and  institutional  factors  as  they 
existed at that time. The 2005 SHARE data also includes recall information on the respondents‟ 
social and economic situation at the time of (early) retirement, namely gender, marital status, 
level of education (6 categories), type of employment (4 categories), hierarchical position (6 
categories), tenure, and firm size (7 categories). The macroeconomic factors include levels of and 
changes in unemployment rate and GDP per capita that account for a country‟s general economic 
condition. As institutional factors that describe the generosity of the pension system at the time of 
                                                 
1 Non-restriction of the sample would have included the „still active in 2004‟ in the comparison group, some of 
which, however, might have retired early but after the year the survey was conducted. For such a sample, a survival 
analysis would have to be applied.  
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retirement we employ the „average gross replacement rate‟ and the „decrease in pension wealth 
accrual‟, also called „implicit tax rate‟ on continued work, obtained from Blöndal and Scarpetta 
(1999) and Duval (2003), respectively. Thus, our variables of interest do not only vary between 
countries  but  also  over  time  and  are  matched  individually  by  the  retirement  date.  The  first 
variable approximates pension system generosity, while the second (and third) measure(s) the 
forgone growth in net pension income when continuing working. As all of these pension system 
indicators are calculated for an average, representative older worker, they reflect the general 
generosity  in  a  given  year  rather  than  being  perfectly  individual-specific  (see  Table  1  for 
descriptive statistics and Table 2 for exact definitions).  
 
--Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here-- 
 
We estimate a standard Logit model, in which the dependent variable takes on the value „1‟ if 
the retired person withdrew early, and „0‟ otherwise. In some models, country fixed effects take 
account of time-invariant institutional features that might equally affect one‟s decision to retire 
early, such as engagement possibilities outside the labor force like civic political participation 
possibilities reflected by the openness of democratic institutions. We include the pension system 
variables jointly, except the case in which the generosity measures are both by Duval (2003). The 
latter  being  correlated  with  0.73  in  our  sample,  we  also  report  regressions  using  one  single 
institutional feature only.
2 We estimate models with time fixed effects and, alternatively, a trend 
variable or country-specific time trends that allow for heterogeneity in the macroeconomic and 
institutional development. Clustering at the country-year level ensures that standard errors are 






The estimated impacts of pension generosity on the probability of retiring early are depicted 
in Table 3. Model 1 shows the results of a model that simply pools the data and does not include 
                                                 
2 The quite high correlation is due to the fact that replacement rates play a role in calculating the implicit tax. 
3 With merely 10 countries, clustering at the country level was not deemed feasible. The country-year level 
comprises all individuals with identical retirement year in the same country, amounting to up to 200 clusters.   
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any fixed effects. All subsequent models include country fixed effects, while model 2 adds time 
fixed effects, model 3 a linear time trend, and model 4 country-specific time trends.  
In  all  models  with  two  generosity  measures  simultaneously  employed,  the  inclusion  of 
country and time fixed effects clearly improves the models‟ fits and significantly alters the effects 
of the coefficients compared to model 1: in models 2 to 4 both the average replacement rate as 
well as the decline in wealth accrual increase the probability of retiring early. The lower part of 
Table 3 corroborates these findings estimating regressions employing one institutional feature 
only, including the implicit tax rate measure from Duval (2003). This is in line with previous 
empirical analyses which report a more generous pension system and a higher implicit tax on 
continued employment to negatively impact labor force participation rates of older persons (e.g. 
Johnson, 2001, Duval, 2003). In the upper part of Table 3, the similarity of the sizes of the 
coefficients  across models  2 to  4 suggests that  how the variation over time is treated is  not 
essential for the results. 
 
--Insert Table 3 about here-- 
 
In order to assess the institutional effects quantitatively, we report in the middle rows of 
Table 3 the predicted probabilities of early retirement for two time points: in the years 1967 and 
2004. Probabilities were calculated at the sample means and the corresponding values for average 
replacement rate (0.2 in 1967 and 0.44 in 2004) and decrease in wealth accrual (0.86 in 1967 and 
2.06 in 2004). Comparing the effects of the institutional settings of 1967 with 2004 allows us to 
assess the impact of the European pension system policies over the last 30 years. As can be seen, 
the predicted effect that increased pension generosity and decreased actuarial neutrality has on 
this probability is substantial: the early retirement inclination increases from approximately 16% 
in 1967 to 63% in 2004. We find no gender-specific difference. Exclusion of retirees before 
1990, who might bias the results due to „selection‟ out of the sample caused by health-related 
attrition, or use of the implicit tax rate measure by Duval (2003), equally reveal increases in early 
retirement probabilities between 1967 and 2004 by ca. 35 and 50 percentage points, respectively.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The question of what determines early retirement has grown in importance as industrialized 
countries  grapple  with  ageing  populations  and  shrinking  labor  forces.  In  the  face  of  such 
changing  demographics,  early  withdrawal  of  employees  and  self-employed  persons  from  the 
active labor force  may  affect  both  economic  growth and the  sustainability of social  security 
systems.  Our  study  is  the  first  international  microdata  analysis  that  assesses  the  impact  of 
pension system generosity and neutrality on individual early retirement decisions in 10 European 
countries between 1967 and 2004. It reveals that differences in pension benefit schemes have a 
very  significant  and  large  impact  on  the  probability  of  early  retirement.  The  changes  in  the 
average replacement rate and decrease in wealth accrual between 1967 and 2004 have caused an 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  observations  mean 
standard 
deviation  minimum  maximum 
           
Early retirement  4782  0.70  0.46  0  1 
Average replacement 
rate  4782  51.93  25.22  0  80 
Decrease in wealth 
accrual  4782  2.36  2.35  -0.80  7.9 
Implicit tax rate  5121  0.44  0.39  -0.05  1.05 
Notes: Descriptive statistics based on regression model 1, Table 3. 
 
Table 2: Definition of pension generosity variables 
Average replacement rate 
Expected gross replacement rate (over the next 5 years) at age 60 in 
regular  retirement  pension  system,  by  which  the  last  gross  wage  is 
translated into pension benefits. Values are averaged across six different 
civil  status  and  wage  levels  (see  Duval,  2003).  For  most  countries, 
values from 1990–1999 and 2003 are available; for some, even earlier 
time  series  starting  in  the  late  1960s.  Values  for  2004  have  been 
replaced by values for 2003. Where applicable, missing values in all 
countries were replaced by linear interpolation. Data made available by 
courtesy of Mr. Duval, OECD (Duval, 2003). For Denmark and Greece, 
this information was unavailable. 
Decrease in wealth accrual  
Cumulated decrease in pension wealth accruals in year of retirement 
through postponing retirement from 55 to 65 years of age. Measured in 
1967 and 1995 for singles with an average wage (Table III.6, Blöndal 
and  Scarpetta,  1999,  p.  65.)  For  Greece  (both  years)  and  for  Spain 
(1967), this information was unavailable. Missing values were replaced 
by linear interpolation, while from 1995 on, values for the year 1995 
were used. 
Implicit tax rate 
Average implicit tax on continued work for 5 more years (at retirement 
age  of  60)  in  the  old-age  pension  system.  Measured  as  cumulated 
decrease  in  pension  wealth  accruals  in  year  of  retirement.  For  most 
countries, values from 1967–1999 are available. Values for 2000-2004 
have been replaced by values for 1999. Data made available by courtesy 
of  Mr.  Duval,  OECD  (Duval,  2003).  For  Denmark  and  Greece,  this 
information was unavailable. 
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Table 3: The effect of pension generosity on the probability of early retirement 
   1  2  3  4 
   pooled     
country-specific 
trends  
Average replacement rate  0,004  0.047***  0.042***  0.045*** 
   (1.07)  (3.25)  (4.83)  (3.57) 
Decrease in wealth accrual  -0.137***  0.805***  0.925***  0.960* 
   (3.86)  (3.62)  (4.75)  (1.93) 
         
Observations  4782  4711  4782  4782 
Pseudo R
2  0,1585  0,2351  0,2308  0,2433 
Wald test (p-value)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Clusters  204  188  204  204 
Country fixed effects  no  yes  yes  yes 
Time fixed effects  no  yes  no  no 
Trend  no  no  yes  yes 
         
  Predicted early retirement probability 
    Full Sample   
- 1967  76%  18%  18%  16% 
- 2004  75%  64%  64%  63% 
    Women Only   
- 1967  79%  25%  15%  14% 
- 2004  75%  69%  68%  67% 
    Retirement after 1990   
Average replacement rate  -.003  .067**  .094***  .062+ 
   (0.92)  (2.78)  (3.80)  (1.62) 
Decrease in wealth accrual  -.031  1.120  2.054***  1.127+ 
   (0.93)  (1.28)  (3.51)  (1.37) 
- 1967 (out of sample)  69%  3%  0%  4% 
- 2004  66%  39%  24%  40% 
Alternative specifications: single institutions regressions 
Average replacement rate  -0.001  0.016  0.042***  0.045*** 
  (0.33)  (1.62)  (4.83)  (3.57) 
Decrease in wealth accrual   -0.110***  0.227  0.535**  1.196** 
  (3.72)  (1.46)  (2.99)  (2.39) 
Implicit tax rate  -0.221  -0.003  0.780***  3.312*** 
  (1.26)  (0.00)  (4.01)  (3.67) 
- 1967 (min = 0)  76%  75.75%  60%  44% 
- 2004 (max = 0.98)  72%  75.69%  68%  93% 
Note: ***, **,* significant at the 1%, 5% and 10%-levels, respectively. + indicates jointly significant at least at the 
5 percent level. Z-statistics in parentheses obtain through clustering at the country-year level. All models include 
changes and levels of GDP, changes and levels of unemployment rates, gender, marital status („married‟), level of 
education (6 categories), type of employment (4 categories), hierarchical position (6 categories), tenure and firm 
size (7 categories). Included countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, and Switzerland 
 